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ADVERSE POSSESSION IN NEW MEXICO-Part Two*
VERLE R. SEEDt

III
OTHER ELEMENTS: THE POSSESSION MUST BE ADVERSE AND
UNDER COLOR OF TITLE

Our statute of limitations statute 68 provides merely that the land
* Part One of this article appeared in 4 Natural Resources J. 559-83 (1964-1965).
t Professor of Law, The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.
68. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-21 (1953):
In all cases where any person or persons, their children, heirs or assigns,
shall have had possession for ten [10] years of any lands, tenements or
hereditaments which have been granted by the governments of Spain, Mexico
or the United States, or by whatsoever authority empowered by said governments to make grants to lands, holding or claiming the same by virtue of a
deed or deeds of conveyance, devise, grant or other assurance purporting to
convey an estate in fee simple, and no claim by suit in law or equity effectually
prosecuted shall have been set up or made to the said lands, tenements or
hereditaments, within the aforesaid time of ten [10] years, then and in that
case, the person or persons, their children, heirs or assigns, so holding possession as aforesaid, shall be entitled to keep and hold in possession such quantity of lands as shall be specified and described in his, her or their deed of
conveyance, devise, grant or other assurance as aforesaid, in preference to
all, and against all, and all manner of person or persons whatsoever; and
any person or persons, their children or their heirs or assigns, who shall
neglect or who have neglected for the said term of ten [10] years, to avail
themselves of the benefit of any title, legal or equitable, which he, she or they
may have to any lands, tenements or hereditaments, within this state, by suit
of law or equity effectually prosecuted against the person or persons so as
aforesaid in possession, shall be forever barred, and the person or persons,
their children, heirs or assigns so holding or keeping possession for the term
of ten [10] years, shall have a good and indefeasible title in fee simple to
such lands, tenements or hereditaments: Provided, that if any person entitled
to commence or prosecute such suit or action is or shall be, at the time the cause
of action therefor first accrued, imprisoned, of unsound mind, or under the age
of twenty-one [21] years, then the time for commencing such action shall in
favor of such persons be extended so that they shall have one [1] year after
the termination of such disability to commence such action; but no cumulative
disability shall prevent the bar of the above limitation, and this proviso shall
only apply to those disabilities which existed when the cause of action first
accrued and to no other.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-22 (1953)
In all cases where any person or persons, their children, heirs or assigns,
shall have had adverse possession continuously and in good faith under color
of title for ten (10) years of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, within
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shall have been actually possessed for ten years, holding or claiming
the same by virtue of a deed or deeds of conveyance, demise, grant,
or other assurance purporting to convey an estate in fee simple. Our
courts have said consistently that such possession must be adverse. 9
Our adverse possession statute 70 provides for "adverse possession
continuously and in good faith under color of title." It also defines
adverse possession as "an actual and visible appropriation of land,
commenced and continued under a color of title and claim of right
inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another." The use in the
statute of the clauses "in good faith" and "claim of right" pose
some questions of construction which would not otherwise exist.
the aforesaid time of ten (10) years, then and in that case, the person or
persons, their children, heirs or assigns, so holding adverse possession as aforesaid, shall be entitled to keep and hold in possession such quantity of lands
as shall be specified and described in some writing purporting to give color of
title to such adverse occupant, in preference to all, and against all, and all
manner of person or persons whatsoever; and any person or persons, their
children or their heirs or assigns who shall neglect or who have neglected for
the said term of ten (10) years, to avail themselves of the benefit of any title,
legal or equitable, which he, she or they may have to any lands, tenements
or hereditaments, within this state, by suit of law or equity effectually prosecuted against the person or persons so as aforesaid in adverse possession,
shall be forever barred, and the person or persons, their children, heirs or assigns so holding or keeping possession as aforesaid for the term of ten (10)
years, shall have a good and indefeasible title in fee simple to such lands,
tenements or hereditaments: Provided, that if any person entitled to commence
or prosecute such suit or action is or shall be, at the time the cause of action
therefor first accrued, imprisoned, of unsound mind, or under the age of twenty-one (21) years, then the time for commencing such action shall in favor of
such persons be extended so that they shall have one (1) year after the termination of such disability to commence such action; but no cumulative
disability shall prevent the bar of the above limitation, and this proviso shall
only apply to those disabilities which existed when the cause of action first
accrued and to no other. "Adverse possession" is defined to be an actual and
visible appropriation of, land, commenced and continued under a color of title
and claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another:
Provided, however, that in the case of severed mineral interests the possession
by the party in possession of the surface shall be considered as the constructive
possession of such mineral claimant until actual possession shall have been
taken by such mineral claimant; and Provided further in no case must "adverse
possession" be considered established within the meaning of the law, unless
the party claiming adverse possession, his predecessors or grantors, have for
the period mentioned in this section continuously paid all the taxes, state, county
and municipal, which during that period have been assessed against the
property.
69. See Montoya v. Catron, 22 N.M. 570, 166 Pac. 909 (1917) ; Merrifield v. Buckner, 41 N.M. 442, 70 P.2d 896 (1937).
70. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-22 (1953), set out in note 68 supra.
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A. Adverseness as a Hostile and Inconsistent Claim
Standing alone, "adverse possession" means a possession which is
hostile to and inconsistent with the right of the true owner. Hostility
of possession ordinarily is indicated by actions rather than express
declarations. It is lacking in the case of a possession which is permissive or is otherwise consistent with the title of the record owner who
permits it to continue. Thus possessions held by an agent or servant
of the owner, by his tenant, or by a cotenant are not adverse. They
may be made so, however, by a repudiation by either party of the special relationship, brought to the other's notice. 71
Most of the New Mexico cases in which hostility of possession has
been discussed as an element have been cases in which the contesting
parties have had simultaneous legal interests in the land, and one of
them has sought to acquire the entire and complete legal title by adverse possession. The most common situation has been that of cotenants. Only a few of the cases are presented.
1. Vendor and Purchaser
In De Bergere v. Chaves,72 the facts were as follows: In 1878,
Manuel A. Otero, owner of the Galisteo Ranch, entered into a written contract in Spanish for the sale of the ranch to Jesus M. Sena y
Baca, by which the latter was entitled to take immediate possession
of the ranch, situated in Santa Fe County. Otero agreed to deliver a
deed as soon as he should have obtained an adjudication and approval
of the Grant of Bartolome Baca, a tract situated in Valencia County.
Sena y Baca, his heirs and other successors in interest, remained continuously in possession of the ranch, farming and leasing it, and exercising all the control over it which an owner would, until 1901,
when the Court of Private Land Claims finally rejected the Bartolome Baca Grant. The court, however, had approved the Galisteo
Ranch. The plaintiffs, heirs of Manuel A. Otero, brought this action
to recover possession of the Galisteo Ranch from its present occupants. The plaintiffs were successful in the trial court. On appeal,
the supreme court affirmed, holding as follows:
'Where one enters into and holds possession of lands under an execu71. See 3 American Law of Property § 15.4(a) (Casner ed. 1952).
72. 14 N.M. 352, 93 Pac. 762 (1908).
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tory contract of purchase or bond for title, the entry and possession
are in subordination to the title of the vendor until payment or performance of all the conditions by the vendee or until the vendee has
distinctly and unequivocally repudiated the title of his vendor, which
repudiation is brought expressly or by legal implication to the vendor's
knowledge.'
The evidence in this case nowhere discloses that Sena y Baca, or his
assigns, ever distinctly and unequivocably repudiated the title of
73
Manuel Antonio Otero.
2. Landlord and Tenant

In Andrews v. Rio Grande Live Stock Co., 74 the plaintiff, Edgar
Andrews, brought action to quiet title in 1908, relying on title by adverse possession. For many years prior to 1897, the land had been in
the possession of Bonanzas Mining Co., which claimed ownership.
In 1889, Bonanzas leased the tract to John Andrews, uncle of the
plaintiff, who went into possession. A short time later, Edgar joined
him in possession, and they continued to occupy the land under the
lease. For some years they paid rent to the company. Then, for some
years prior to 1896, they paid no rent, but continued to recognize the
tenancy until 1897. In October 1897, the sheriff, on execution against
one of the paper holders of the title sold the tract at public auction
to one Bennett, for the use of the Andrews. The fact that the sale
was for the use of the Andrews was announced publicly at the sale, at
which a representative of Bonanzas was present. After the sale, the
sheriff again announced to the Bonanzas representative that the sale
was to Bennett. The sheriff, at the request of the Andrews, issued his
deed to Fritz Muller, the Andrews paying the consideration. Muller

was another uncle of Edgar Andrews. Muller held the title until
1903, when, at the request of John Andrews, he deeded it to Edgar.
In the interim, the Andrews put up the money for taxes; after the
deed to Edgar, the land was assessed to him, and he paid the taxes.
It was admitted that the sheriff's deed to Muller was void, because

of certain irregularities, but the defendant conceded that it would
nevertheless constitute color of title. The defendant contended that
from 1897 to 1903, Edgar and his uncle did not hold the land adversely, but held it in subserviency to and under the claimed title of
73. Id. at 367, 93 Pac. at 765.
74. 16 N.M. 529, 120 Pac. 311 (1911).
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Bonanzas. The lower court upheld this contention, but this judgment
was reversed on appeal. The supreme court declared that:
The solution . . . depends upon whether the facts occurring at the
sale of the property by the sheriff, in 1897, and the continued occupancy
and cultivation of the land by Andrews, was a sufficient renunciation
and disclaimer of the title of the landlord, under which Andrews had
theretofore held the land, to set the statute in motion. In the case of
Willison v. Watkins 7' . . . the Supreme Court of the United States
considered and declared the law to be settled, that a purchase by a
tenant of an adverse title, claiming under or attorning to it, or any
other disclaimer of tenure with knowledge of the landlord, was a
forfeiture of his term; that his possession became so adverse, that the
act of limitation would run in his favor, from the time of such forfeiture; and the landlord could sustain ejectment against him without
notice to quit. This case has been repeatedly cited with approval by
that and other courts. The appellee, the defendant, is not claiming
under or in privity with the title of the Bonanzas Mining Company,
the landlord, and the Bonanzas Mining Company is not asserting
the tenancy, but appellee is relying upon the relationship of landlord
and tenant between appellant and a third party to prevent the statue
from running against it. We think the facts sufficient to set the statute
running against the landlord and all other claimants or owners. The
agent of the Bonanzas Company was present at the sheriff's sale ....
The sheriff announced that he had sold the property to Ed Bennett
for Andrews; the agent of the landlord heard the statement made,
and, as Andrews was present, heard the statement made, apparently
understood it, by his silence acquiesced in it. Had the statement been
untrue the circumstances certainly called for a denial on his part,
which was not made. Later, the sheriff again told the agency of the
Bonanzas Company that Ed Bennett purchased the property for Andrews. Thereafter, no rent was paid or tendered by Andrews to the
landlord; no act was done by him which could in any way be construed
as an admission of the title of the landlord. He used the premises as
his own, repaired buildings and fences and cultivated the fields. Had
Andrews taken the deed in his own name; had he himself been the
bidder and the purchaser at the sale, certainly there would be no dispute as to his renunciation of the title of his landlord, and we cannot
see how the fact that the bid was made by a third party for Andrews,
all of which was known to the landlord, and the title was taken in some
other name, for his use, can alter the case. We think the facts sufficientof the landlord's title and were sufficient
ly establish the renunciation
76
to set the statute in motion.
75. 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 43 (1830).
76. Andrews v. Thomas, 16 N.M. 529, 534-35, 120 Pac. 311, 312-13 (1911).
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3. Husband and Wife
In Torrez v. Brady,77 certain heirs of the defendant's wife brought
suit to partition land occupied by the defendant. The defendant had
occupied the premises with his wife for sixteen years until her death,
which occurred ten years before the suit was begun. The property
had been the wife's separate property at the time for her marriage
to the defendant. The defendant claimed that because of such possession, the plaintiffs were bound by the statute of limitations. The
trial court ruled against the defendant, and this ruling was upheld
on appeal. As to the defendant's contention that his possession of the
land while his wife was alive constituted possession adverse to the
wife's estate, the supreme court stated:
The land was admittedly the separate property of appellant's wife at
the time of his marriage to her, and the court, we think, properly found
that the possession of appellant of said lands during the period of
coverture, was a joint possession with his wife, and was by virture
of his marital relationship to her.
Such a possession of real estate
by the husband could not be said to
78
be adverse to the wife's estate.

4. Tenants in Common
In Torrez v. Brady,"9 the same case as that discussed immediately
above, the defendant also claimed that his possession of the land for
a period of ten years subsequent to his wife's death and prior to the
partition suit barred the plaintiff's action. Upon his wife's death, the
defendant husband became a cotenant with the plaintiff heirs. The
trial court again ruled adversely to the defendant, and this ruling was
also upheld on appeal. The supreme court held that the defendant's
possession was the possession of all the heirs at law of his wife's
estate:
In Bradford v. Armijo8 0 . . . this court, in speaking upon the same
subject, said: 'There is a strong presumption against every claim of a

cotenant that he holds possession in opposition to the rights of his cotenants, and, in the absence of evidence to that effect, he will be pre77.
78.
79.
text.
80.

37 N.M. 105., 19 P.2d 183 (1932).
Id. at 109-10, 19 P.2d at 186.
37 N.M. 105, 19 P.2d 183 (1932). See notes 77 and 78 supra and accompanying
28 N.M. 288, 297, 210 Pac. 1070, 1074 (1922).
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sumed to hold for all of the cotenants. Every element of adverse
possession must be shown. There must be express denial of the title
and right to possession of the fellow cotenant, brought home in the
latter openly and unequivocally.
We are satisfied with the rule thus announced, and it is also generally held that the continued possession of the wife's land by her husband after the wife's death would not be considered adverse to her
heirs at law until actual knowledge of the adverse claim was brought
home to the heirs.81

In Thurmond v. Espalin,s2 the plaintiff brought suit to quiet title,
claiming title by adverse possession. The controversy in this case
arose as follows: Two brothers, Jose and Damacio Espalin, each
held undivided one-half interests in the land in question. Damacio
died, leaving as his heirs two sons, Damacio and Ramon, the defendants. Jose deeded his one-half interest to his wife, Matilda Es-

palin. On April 5, 1929, Matilda executed and delivered a styled
quit-claim deed to the lands involved to Thurmond, the plaintiff,
which deed was recorded April 6, 1929. This deed did not purport

to convey merely Matilda's undivided one-half interest, but the entire premises. Thurmond immediately went into possession of the
lands, fenced the lands theretofore unfenced, used the land for stock
grazing, and in later years used a small portion for raising crops. He
paid the taxes at all times. The trial court entered judgment for the
plaintiff and this judgment was affirmed. Numerous issues, including
"color of title," "claim of right," "good faith," etc. were raised in
this case, and excerpts from it will appear later under these subjects.
At present we are concerned only with what the court had to say with
regard to adverse possession as among tenants in common. On appeal, thedefendants asserted that the plaintiff's possession was for
them as well as for himself and therefore was not hostile to them. In
support of this argument, the defendants claimed that since Matilda
Espalin had only a one-half undivided interest in the land, her deed
to the plaintiff conveyed only that interest (although it purported to
convey the fee), and the plaintiff, therefore, took the land as a cotenant with the defendants. The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected this contention as follows :"8
81. Torrez v. Brady, 37 N.M. 105, 110-11, 19 P.2d 183, 186 (1932).
82. 50 N.M. 109, 171 P.2d 325 (1946).
83. Id. at 119, 171 P.2d at 331.
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The act of the grantor . . . in assuming to convey to a stranger the
entire title as if she owned it was a repudiation of the existing cotenancy. It has been held that the effect of such a conveyance is to
terminate the cotenancy. Jones v. Siler8 4 ...
Matilda W. Espalin did not convey an undivided one-half interest
in the property, but, on the contrary, conveyed the entire premises.
The acceptance of the deed by the grantee, his entry under it and his
continued acts thereafter of ownership of, and dominion over, all of
the land were likewise hostile to the rights of appellants. The conveyance by Matilda W. Espalin of the entire estate in the entirety was
decisive of her purpose to appropriate the entire estate to her own
use, and entry by Thurmond under the deed was equally evincive of
his intention to claim the whole to the exclusion of the other cotenants
of his grantor, if any, and upon the recording of the deed, this disseisin became complete.
According to the opinion in Jones v. Siler,8s . . . Thurmond's possession and the recording of the deed delivered to him, gave appellants
constructive notice of the hostile character of his claim. .

.

. 'The

recording of the deed, without possession by the grantee, would not
have given notice. This because of the general rule that one is not
charged with notice by the registration of an instrument which is not in
his chain of title. [Citation omitted.] But possession is equivalent of
registration, in that it gives constructive notice of the possessor's rights.
[Citation omitted.] Siler's possession pointed to the records for the
information contained in his deed as to the source, nature, and extent
of his claim. The function of the recorded deed here, to aid and explain the notice given by possession, is the same as that of the recorded
deed in the ordinary case where title is claimed under the five-year
statute of limitations. [Citations ommitted.] 86
In making use of the foregoing quotation, we do not mean to express an opinion as to whether under our registration laws, the recording of a deed has the limited effect stated in the Texas case. We say
that our registration laws are at least as potent as claimed for the
Texas statute as construed ....
And see also Pickens v. Stout 87 . . . where the proposition was
discussed and the court had this to say on the question of notice:
'Every owner is deemed to be cognizant of what is done upon his land
and of who is in possession of it. The law exacts this measure of diligence from him. He must know whether strangers are entering upon
it, and, knowing that, must inquire by what right they do so. In every
instance, such inquiry will presumptively lead to discovery of the
84. 129 Tex. 18, 100 S.W.2d 352 (1937).

85. Ibid.
86. Jones v. Slier, 129 Tex. 18, 100 S.W.2d 352, 355 (1937).
87. 67 W. Va. 422, 68 S.E. 354 (1910).
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hostile claim. Hence the owner is bound to know, and is estopped from
denying, all information to which such inquiry, prosecuted with reasonable diligence, would have led' s88
...

B. Color of Title
Color of title is a well-recognized and reasonably well understood
concept in connection with title by adverse possession but seldom is
made a mandatory requirement. Even less frequently do statutes
couple the color of title requirement with qualifications of "good
faith" or "claim of right." In New Mexico, however, section 23-12289 requires that adverse possession be "in good faith under color
of title," and defines adverse possession as being an actual and visible
appropriation of land commenced and continued "under a color of
title and claim of right." The New Mexico Supreme Court holds that
color of title is essential also to acquisition of legal title by adverse
possession under section 23-1-21.90 This section does require that
actual possession be "under a conveyance . . . or other assurance

purportingto convey an estate in fee simple."'" Such conveyance "or
other assurance" can only, perforce, pass color of title. If it were
legal title, recourse to the statute of limitations would be unnecessary. 92 What will and will not serve as color of title in New Mexico
appears from the following decisions.
In Armijo v. Trujillo,93 the plaintiff brought action to recover
certain land. The defendants, claiming that the plaintiff was barred
by the statute of limitations, were successful in the trial court. The
88. Pickens v. Stout, 67 W. Va. 422, 432-33, 68 S.E. 354, 359 (1910).
89. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-22 (1953), set out in note 68 supra.
90. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-21 (1953), set out in note 68 supra.
91. Ibid: (Emphasis added.)
92. See Ward v. Rodriquez, 43 N.M. 191, 194, 88 P.2d 277, 279, cert. denied, 307
U.S. 627 (1939). See also Burby, Real Property § 223 (2d ed. 1954) :
Color of title consists of a writing which, although inoperative as a conveyance, is believed by the occupant to constitute a valid conveyance .... [C]olor
of title is essential even where not required by statute if the adverse claimant
seeks to take advantage of the doctrine of constructive adverse possession.
See also 3 American Law of Property § 15.4 (Casner ed. 1952):
As used in treating of adverse possession, 'color of title' is an instrument or
a record which appears to convey title but which in fact does not have that
effect. Regardless of the invalidity of title which is inherent in the term itself,
it affords good evidence of the hostility of the possession of the grantee and
may lessen the notoriety and frequency of his acts of ownership from what
would otherwise be required to show title in him by adverse possession. In the
few states whose statutes impose a requirement of color of title, a possession
will not ripen into title without it.
93. 4 N.M. (Gild.) 57, 13 Pac. 92 (1887).
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defendants claimed that they held the land under color of title, but
they did not show any writing or conveyance which purported to
grant the land to them. The supreme court reversed, saying:
Color is not every pretense or claim of title, but consists in a writing
or conveyance of some kind purporting to convey the land under which
the claim of title is asserted. What constitutes color of title is a ques-

tion of law for the court, and not of fact for the jury, except under
proper instructions from the court. Color of title, strictly4 speaking,
cannot rest in parol. There must be a document of some sort.
In Sandoval v. Perez,95 the plaintiff successfully recovered possession of land from the defendant. On appeal, the defendant, who set
up the statute of limitations in bar to the plaintiff's claim, contended
that a writing is not essential to show color of title. The supreme
court, in affirming, rejected this contention, saying :6
It is appellant's contention that a writing is not essential to color of
title, and that actual adverse possession by virtue of which the occupant
claims ownership is under color of title. The statute . . . requires the
adverse possession to be under 'color of titLe'.

. .

. [T]he prevailing

rule in the United States [is] as follows: 'By the weight of authority,
some writing which purports to give title to the premises is essential to
give title to an adverse occupant; and oral transactions, however effective they may be as between the parties, do not constitute color of
title.' 7
9 8 the plaintiff sued in ejectment to recover
In Garcia v. Pineda,
certain land. The defendants set up title by adverse possession, and
prevailed in the trial court. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that
the defendants had not shown color of title, in that the defendants'
color of title rested upon an 1871 conveyance, 99 in the Spanish lan94. Id. at 63, 13 Pac. at 94.
95. 26 N.M. 280, 191 Pac. 467 (1920).
96. Id. at 282, 191 Pac. at 467.
97. The "prevailing rule" was quoted by the New Mexico court from Annot., 2
A.L.R. 1453, 1457 (1919).
98. 33 N.M. 651, 275 Pac. 370 (1929).
99. The conveyance contained the following description, as translated:
'A small sod house composed of two small rooms and a small hallway, which
have been erected upon the locality which corresponds with property of Antonio Silva, and which house I have sold together with the little courtyard

[chorreras] as specified in this present document. First, on the south side a
courtyard of ten varas; on the east seven and a half varas; on the north three
varas; and west to the line which is the old public wagon road.'
Id. at 652, 275 Pac. at 370.
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guage, which the plaintiff contended was too indefinite and uncertain
to constitute color of title. The defendants' color of title was also supported by testimony tending to identify the land described in the
conveyance. The supreme court, in affirming, held that the description was sufficient:
It is contended that the . . . description is so indefinite and uncer-

tain that the deed was not receivable as color of title, and that extrinsic evidence was not competent to identify the land. Counsel
contends that an instrument to constitute color of title must contain a
description sufficient to pass title .

. .

. We may admit, without

deciding, the correctness of this rule. Still we must hold that the . . .
description was sufficient to permit of identification of the land and
the passing of title.' 00

In Green v. Trumbull,'1 1 the plaintiff brought suit to quiet title to
certain land. Plaintiff sought to establish title by way of adverse
possession, relying upon the unprobated will of his mother as constituting color of title. The will had been filed in the probate court
and notice had been given of the time of hearing, but no order admitting the will to probate appeared in the record. The plaintiff was
mentioned only in the residuary clause of the will, 10 2 which purported to devise the residue of the testatrix's estate, "wheresoever
it may be found, and of whatsoever it may consist," to her children.
The trial court refused to admit the will in evidence, and the
supreme court upheld this ruling, saying:
It is often held that parol evidence is permissible to apply but not to
supply description. .

.

. The residuary clause contains no description

of any particular tract. Taking the will alone, claim might be made
to 30,000 acres of the Las Vegas land grant as well as to the 370
acres. There is nothing whatever in this clause of the will to identify
the land as being that claimed by defendant. It is necessary to call
for information not referred to in the will in order to identify the
100. Id. at 652, 275 Pac. at 370. See also Gutierrez v. Ortiz, 58 N.M. 187, 268 P.2d
979 (1954), which holds that a tax deed, even though void, may constitute "color of
title" sufficient to support a claim of title by adverse possession.
101. 37 N.M. 604, 26 P.2d 1079 (1933).
102. The residuary clause of the will read as follows:
All the residue of my estate, real, personal and mixed, wheresoever it may
be found, and of whatsoever it may consist, I give and devise unto my children ... [naming them] share and share alike, to hold to them and their
heirs forever.'
Id. at 604, 26 P.2d at 1079.
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land it suit. There must be at least a descriptive word in the written
instrument relied upon as color of title which furnishes the key to
the identity.'0 3

Turner v. Sanchez 1°4 was an action of ejectment in which the
plaintiff's right to possession of the lands in dispute was that of a
purchaser at a tax sale. At all material times, defendant was in
actual, visible, and hostile possession of the lands involved, farming
it under a warranty deed to him as grantee, dated August 20, 1942,
executed by the Corporation of Mesilla. The plaintiff conceded the
sufficiency of description in the deed, but contended that it did not
furnish color of title, since it was not shown that the land granted
by the deed was land held in common (i.e., not allotted) by the Corporation of Mesilla. The plaintiff supported this contention by reference to an earlier New Mexico case' 0 5 which held that the
Corporation of Mesilla had no power of disposition over lands
not held in common, and that a party claiming under a deed from
the Corporation must show that the lands purported to be conveyed
were part of the lands held in common. The trial court sustained
the plaintiff's objection to the deed and refused to receive it in evidence. The supreme court reversed, saying that
such a deed, notwithstanding its infirmities, may afford color of
title sufficient to support a claim of adverse possession. It has been
asserted that deeds which are defective because of want of title or of
authority to convey in the grantor, may be 'color' of title. .

.

. Even

void or voidable conveyances, or even fraudulent conveyances, will

give 'color' of title. 10 6

C. Color of Title in Constructive Adverse Possession
In addition to being a mandatory requirement for acquisition of
title by adverse possession, color of title serves the same purposes in
New Mexico that it does under the common law. It permits adverse
title to be acquired to the entire described tract although only a portion thereof is actually occupied. This is the doctrine of constructive
adverse possession. Of course, in New Mexico, the taxes must also
be paid upon the entire tract. The doctrine of constructive adverse
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 605-06, 26 P.2d at 1080.
50 N.M. 15, 168 P.2d 96 (1946).
Williams v. Lusk, 28 N.M. 146, 207 Pac. 576 (1922).
Turner v. Sanchez, 50 N.M. 15, 19, 168 P.2d 96, 98 (1946).
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possession will not apply, however, if the legal owner is in actual
occupancy of another portion of the tract during the period of ad10 7
verse possession.
Quintana v. Montoya.. was an action in ejectment for possession
of a tract of land, the defendant-appellant relying upon title by adverse possession. A decision of the trial court for the plaintiff was
reversed on appeal, the court saying:
There is nothing in the record to show fraud or bad faith in obtaining the quiet title decree made in favor of appellant's husband in
1927, and the district court refused to find that there was bad faith
in obtaining of this decree.
The evidence shows that the appellant and her husband had possession of the property under the quiet title decree and paid taxes
thereon for more than the ten-year statutory period to entitle the appellant to have title by adverse possession.
We believe and hold that the quiet title decree of 1927 by which
appellant's husband was decreed to be the owner of the property constitutes color of title.
The appellee claims that the appellant was in actual possession of
only a portion of the land and not all of the land in question. We
believe that even if this be true the authorities generally hold that one
who is in possession of land under color of title, holding under adverse possession, such person is constructively in possession of all of
the land which is described in the instrument giving color of
title.' 09
D. The Possession Must Be Adverse in Intent
Our "adverse possession" statute" 0 provides that the claimant
"shall have had adverse possession . . . in good faith under color
of title for ten years . . .";"' and, later, "adverse possession is defined to be an actual and visible appropriation of land, commenced
107. Montoya v. Catron, 22 N.M. 570, 166 Pac. 909 (1917). See also Tiffany, Real
Property § 752 (Tollman abr. ed. 1940):
In the case of overlapping invalid conveyances the grantee who first takes
actual possession of part of the land obtains constructive possession of the
land covered by both conveyances, to the exclusion of any subsequent acquisition of merely constructive (as distinguished from actual) possession by
the other.
108. 64 N.M. 464, 330 P.2d 549 (1958) ; see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 397 (1958).
109. Id. at 469, 330 P.2d at 552.
110. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-22 (1953), set out in note 68 supra.
111. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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and continued under a color of title and claim of right inconsistent
with and hostile to the claim of another ....

11

3

Our "statute of limitation" statute" contains neither of the
above-quoted requirements nor their equivalent.
The essence of the adverseness which will give the necessary cause
of action [to the legal owner] is a possession which is inconsistent
with and hostile to the right of the true owner. Not only should the
possession be open and notorious in order that by observation or report the owner has an opportunity to know of it, but the fact that the
possession is hostile should also be open and notorious for the same
of. hosreason. However, actions rather than express declarations
14
tility are ordinarily sufficient to produce this result."
1. "Claim of Right" as an Element of Hostility and Adverseness
of Possession
The legislature which in 1858"" used the qualifying words or
phrases relative to hostility of claim and to intent in the use of color
of title, seems to have been aping a point of view at that time
popular with a good many courts." 6 These courts had inserted such
seeming requirements of subjective intent of the adverse possessor
by judicial edict even without the legislative use of such phrases.
What these courts did was to create confusion and controversy
which has continued until this day. These courts seem to say that A,
a landowner, cannot maintain an action to evict or eject a man who
is in actual wrongful possession of A's land without A's consent
unless such wrongful possessor proclaims that he is claiming the title
to A's land to be his own, and therefore claims the right to be upon
A's land. Where the owner has no cause of action, of course, the
statute of limitations cannot begin to run.
It logically followed, as one old and otherwise forgotten case had
it, that the unlawful possessor must continue to keep his banner flying-i.e., to continue to proclaim his claim of title."17
Calmer and more logical courts began to say that these terms
meant only that the actions of the occupant must show an intent to
112. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
113. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-21 (1953), set out in note 68 supra.
114. 3 American Law of Property § 15.4(a) (Casner ed. 1952).
115. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-22 (1953), set out in note 68 supra.
116. Rickard v. Williams, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 59 (1822) ; Jackson, ex dem. Dunbar
v. Todd, 2 Cai. R. 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) ; Ives v. Hulet, 12 Vt. 314 (1840) ; M'Cali
v. Neely, 3 Watts 69 (Pa. 1841).
117. Jasperson v. Scharnikow, 150 Fed. 571 (9th Cir. 1907).
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appropriate and use the land as his own, or the same as if it were his
own, to the exclusion of all others; and that such a use gave the
owner a cause of action for the wrongdoer's eviction.11 s
And so today, the following statement should be true whether the
terms "claim of title" or "claim of right" are judically proclaimed
or set forth in a statute:
The great majority of the cases establish convincingly that the alleged
requirements of claim of title and of hostility of possession mean
only that the possessor must use and enjoy the property continuously
for the required period as the average owner would use it, without
the consent of the true owner and therefore in actual hostility to him
irrespective of the possessor's actual state of mind or intent.11 9
2. What "Good Faith" Means in Connection With Color of Title
The New Mexico Supreme Court seems to feel that good faith is
a requirement distinct from "claim of right." Both phrases are
touched upon in the case of Thurmond v. Espalin120 which is set out
in part below.
In Thurmond, the plaintiff sued to quiet title to a tract of land,
claiming title by adverse possession. The defendants claimed a
three-tenths interest in the land. The trial court found that the plaintiff, in 1929, obtained a quitclaim deed to the land, the grantor in
which owned only an undivided one-half interest therein. However,
the deed purported to convey the entire property, rather than merely
the title or interest of the grantor. The trial court also found that
the plaintiff had satisfied all the other requirements for adverse possession, citing them; and issued a decree quieting title in the plaintiff
and declaring that the defendants had no right, title or interest in
the land. The defendants appealed, contending that there was an
absence of a showing of good faith by the plaintiff in the acquisition
of his color of title, and also that the plaintiff did not assert a claim
of right to the entire title to the land in good faith. The defendants
conceded that a quitclaim deed which purports to convey the property itself, as distinguished from merely the interest or title of the
grantor in it, is color of title so far as form is concerned. But the
118. Iowa R.R. Land Co. v. Blumer, 206 U.S. 482 (1907) ; Skipworth v. Martin, 50
Ark. 141, 6 S.W. 514 (1887) ; Roach v. Knappenberger, 172 Ark. 417, 288 S.W. 912
(1926). See also 3 American Law of Property § 15.4(b) n.42 (Casner ed. 1952).
119. 3 American Law of Property § 15.4(b) (Casner ed. 1952) ; cf. Walsh, Title by
Adverse Possession, 16 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 532, 547 (1939). In the analogous field of prescription, see Restatement, Property § 458, comments c & d (1944).
120. 50 N.M. 109, 171 P.2d 325 (1946).
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defendants argued that the color of title requirement was not satisfied because the plaintiff's grantor actually owned only an undivided
interest, and that she did not intend by her deed to convey, nor did
the plaintiff intend to acquire, the whole of the property. It was
clear that if the plaintiff did not at first know of the existence of the
undivided interests of the other co-owners, he learned of them soon
after he received his deed. The supreme court affirmed the decree
of the trial court, relying heavily upon various and sundry quotations from Corpus Juris Secundum. While probably a reading of the
entire opinion is necessary for complete comprehension of the position of the court, an attempt is made hereafter to set forth the more
conclusive statements.
[I]f the color of title may serve to limit the boundaries of the plaintiff's claim, we see no reason why it may not also serve to limit or define the extent and nature of the claim with respect to the estate
claimed.
If the deed in question had expressly conveyed only an undivided
one-half interest, we think it could not 1be
doubted that it were not
21
color of title to the interest not conveyed.
*

0

0

0

We do not hesitate to say that if the plaintiff's 'claim of right' was
to only an undivided one-half interest in the land here involved and
he acknowledged the claim of others to an undivided one-half interest
therein, such a claim was not 'inconsistent with and hostile to the
claim of the defendants,' and therefore such a claim would not support adverse possession of the entire estate in the lands unless the
claim of others so recognized was repudiated and adverse possession
was distinctly commenced 2 2and continued effectively against such
1
erstwhile recognized claim.

We are now concerned with what constitutes good faith by one who
invokes . . . [Section 23-1-22123] which requires broadly that adverse possession must be in good faith.
'Good faith in the creation or acquisition of color of title is freedom
from a design to defraud the person having the better title, and the
knowledge of an adverse claim to or lien upon the property does not,
121. Id. at 114, 171 P.2d at 328.
122. Id. at 115, 171 P.2d at 328.
123. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-22 (1953), set out in note 68 supra.
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of itself, indicate bad faith in a purchaser, and is not even evidence
of it, unless accompanied by some improper means to defeat such
24
claim or lien.' 1
A further rule to guide our consideration is that: 'It is presumed
that the color of title of one claiming by adverse possession was acquired in good faith, and that the parties
so entered into and held
25
possession. Bad faith is never presumed.' 1
Plaintiff had color of title fair on its face to the land described.
• . . According to a finding of the court, the plaintiff immediately
entered into possession of the land. We think these facts make out a
prima facie case for plaintiff. . . . 'But knowledge of a defect in
title is not of itself inconsistent with a bona fide claim of right.
Where a claimant puts a deed upon record and enters into possession,
his possession is presumptively referable to his deed. In such case, in
so far as good faith is essential to his claim of right, it is presumed in
his favor.' 126
We may not, as have some courts, ignore the element of good faith
in adverse possession cases, because of the great difficulty of judicial
investigation into the hidden motives of the entry or possession and all
questions of good faith respecting the same. But these difficulties suggest the propriety of the requirement that where one relying upon
adverse possession has satisfied all other elements of it, one who challenges the good faith of the occupant must clearly discharge the
burden of overcoming the presumption of good faith which flows
from the occupant's open, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, hostile
27
possession with the payment of taxes for the statutory period.'

The position of our supreme court in Thurmond v. Espalin seems
to be that while it cannot ignore completely the statutory require-

ments of "good faith" and "claim of right," it can take away most
of their significance by looking first to see if all of the other elements
for adverse possession have been satisfied. If so, then this creates a
presumption of conformity to the requirements of good faith and
claim of right. Such prima facie case will prevail unless the former
124. Thurmond v. Espalin, 50 N.M. 109, 115, 171 P.2d 325, 329 (1946). The language quoted by the court is from Third Nat. Exch. Bank v. Smith, 20 N.M. 264, 276,
148 Pac. 512, 516 (1915), aff'd, 244 U.S. 184 (1916).
125. Id. at 116-17, 171 P.2d at 330. The language quoted by the court is from 2 C.J.S.
4dverse Possession § 219 (1936).
126. Id. at 117, 171 P.2d at 330. The Language quoted by the court is from 2 C.J.S.
Adverse Possession § 170 n.72 (1936).
127. Id. at 119, 171 P.2d at 331.
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owner clearly discharges the burden of overcoming such presumption.
In Witherspoon v. Brummett,128 it was held that the adverse
possessor had acquired in good faith color of title, consisting of an
administrator's deed which was void on its face. Preceding the issuance of this deed, certain provisions of the statute for the sale of
property by administrators were not followed. In Apodaca v. Hernandez,'2 9 it was held that the method employed by the adverse
possessors to acquire their color of title-a quitclaim deed from the
grantee under a tax deed to whom the adverse possessors had advanced the money to purchase the tax title as a straw man-was not
in good faith, and so did not lay the foundation for the application
of the statute of limitation. The two foregoing cases, taken together,
indicate that "bad faith," if any, is to be found not in the relative
appearance of validity of the instrument chosen for color of title,
but in the methods used in the acquisition of such instrument.
E. Adverse Possession in Boundary Disputes
Boundary disputes between adjoining landowners are sometimes
decided by application of the doctrine of acquiescence, sometimes
under the "ancient fence" doctrine, and sometimes on principles of
adverse possession.
The notion that an actual claim of right must exist rather than a
claim of wrong demonstrated by the possessor's open and notorious
acts of ownership has disappeared for the most part in the great majority of states where boundary disputes are not involved . . . but

the notion lives on in a considerable number of states in cases of boundary disputes in which one of the parties has been in open and notorious possession of the strip of land in dispute up to a fence, hedge, or
other physical boundary, believing it to be the true line of division,
but he admits, on cross-examination usually, that he intended to claim
title only to the true line. . . . The weight of authority strongly
supports the position that the mental attitude of the possessor is
immaterial, and an actual open and notorious possession which is
wrongful since it is without the consent of the owner is necessarily
adverse and ripens into title in the usual way when the period of the
statute has run.

30

128. 50 N.M. 303, 176 P.2d 187 (1946).
129. 61 N.M. 449, 302 P.2d 177 (1956).
130. 3 American Law of Property § 15.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
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The position of our supreme court with reference to the effect of
mistake in boundary disputes seems, unfortunately, to be at odds
with that taken with reference to the meaning of good faith in connection with color of title. In the former type of controversy, mental
attitude of the alleged adverse possessor does seem to be taken into
account, in accordance with what the American Law of Property
states above to be the minority view.
In Ward v. Rodriguez,' the plaintiff, Ward, relying for title
upon a tax deed, filed an action for ejectment against the defendants
seeking determination of title to a disputed strip of land of some
eleven acres lying between their two properties. This strip either
belonged to and was a part of the property and eighty-acre tract
claimed by the defendants or to the adjoining tract claimed by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed the land because it was included within
the exterior boundaries, according to government survey and
description, of the land granted by his tax deed. The defendants
asserted title upon the ground that the original survey of the properties and especially the proper establishment of the north and
south medial line of the two properties placed the disputed strip
within the boundaries of their land; and, if not, that the strip had
become theirs by virtue of their having acquired title thereto by
adverse possession.
The trial court held for the plaintiff upon the following grounds:
(1) by the original survey, as confirmed by resurveys, the strip was
actually within the plaintiff's boundaries; and (2) the defendants
had failed to show acquisition of the strip by adverse possession. On
appeal, the supreme court upheld the trial court's finding that the
strip actually lay within the original boundaries of the plaintiff's
property. It also held that the defendant's patent formed color of
title to its claim of title by adverse possession. Any issue as to payment of taxes was bypassed. This left only the question: whether
one who locates a boundary fence, believing it to be on the true
boundary line and intending to claim to such line, is in adverse
possession to the fence when it turns out to be located beyond the
true boundary line. The supreme court answered this question
negatively:
'A few decisions hold, without qualification that one who, through
misapprehension as to boundaries of his land, occupies and possesses
131. 43 N.M. 191, 88 P.2d 277 (1939).
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land of another for the statutory period thereby acquires title by adverse possession. Nevertheless, according to the great weight of authority, when occupancy of the land is by a mere mistake and with
no intention on the part of the occupant to claim as his own land
which does not belong to him, but with the intention to claim only
' 182
to the true line wherever it may be, the holding is not adverse.
It is apparent from the testimony of defendant . . . that he never

fenced the land intending to claim beyond the true boundary. He said
the lines were pointed out to him and he undertook to build the fence
in question in line with the fences of his neighbors both to the north
and the south. He was clearly trying to build on the true line and not
to make an appropriation of the land of his neighbor. The fact that
he now insists upon his old fence line being the true line under the
original survey shows clearly that fixing the line as he did was under
a mistake of fact as to the true lines, and did not grow out of any
agreement, or acquiescence by or dispute with the adjoining owners.
Defendants tried to place their fence on the true line and still maintain they have done so. The trial court properly found they had not
done so.
So, the principle of acquiring title by adverse possession, or upon a
theory of agreement, estoppel or acquiescence in such fixing of the
boundary line, are all out.
Defendants thought their fence was upon the proper and true line.
The record throws no light upon the attitude of any of plaintiff's
predecessors in title, the adjoining owners, during any of the time,
but we must assume, in the absence of proof, that they never understood that defendants were intending to claim beyond the true line.
Title is not acquired in this way. 33

F. Payment of Taxes.
The payment of taxes is not required as a prerequisite to acquisition of title under our "statute of limitations" section; 134 but is a
requirement under the "adverse possession" statute. 135
132. Id. at 196-97, 88 P.2d at 281, quoting from 2 C.J. Adverse Possession §§ 242-43

(1915).
133. Id. at 197, 88 P.2d at 281.
134. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-21 (1953), set out in note 68 supra.
135. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-22 (1953). The language in which the requirement is
stated is:
[A]nd Provided further in no case must 'adverse possession' be considered established with the meaning of the law, unless the party claiming adverse possession, his predecessors or grantors, have for the period mentioned in this
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Generally, payment of taxes is not a prerequisite to the acquisition
of title by adverse possession. However, in some states, statutes provide that title cannot be acquired by adverse possession unless the
claimant pays all taxes assessed against the land during the statutory
period. These statutes have apparently been enacted for the benefit of
the owner; by an examination of the tax record he can ascertain the
fact that an adverse claim to his land is being asserted. But the adverse claimant can perfect his title if he pays taxes, even though the
true owner also pays the taxes assessed against the land. To meet the
requirement, the claimant must pay the taxes as they accrue. Eventual
payment of taxes that have accrued in the past years is not a proper
compliance.
The payment of taxes, under some statutes, will invoke a shorter
period of limitations. In any jurisdiction, the payment of taxes by an
adverse claimant is evidence of a claim of title, and tends to fix the
scope or extent of the claim. It is clear, however, that the payment of
taxes alone will not be sufficient basis upon which to sustain the claim
possession of the
of title by adverse possession. Actual or 3constructive
6
land for the statutory period is essential.'

In Turner v. Sanchez,1 37 the plaintiff, a purchaser of land at a tax
sale, brought an action to eject the defendant. The defendant had
been in actual, visible, and hostile possession of the land, but not for
the full prescriptive period. After the tax sale, the defendant had
made offers to redeem the land, which would have been sufficient to
defeat the plaintiff's title under the tax sale redemption statute ls
if the defendant had a "legal or equitable right"'13 9 in the property
at the time he offered to redeem. The trial court found for the
plaintiff, but the supreme court reversed, saying:
It has been asserted, and we do not doubt, that one who has acquired title to land by adverse possession has a legal and/or equitable
right in land sold for taxes sufficient upon which to predicate the
right to redeem from a tax sale and we think the right also extends
to one who may not yet have completed the prescriptive procedure,
if he is in good faith on his way. Our law gives one the right to acsection continuously paid all the taxes, state, county and municipal, which during that period have been assessed against the property.
This tax-paying requirement was first inserted in the statute by N.M. Laws 1899, ch.
53, § 2.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Burby, Real Property § 220 (2d ed. 1954).
50 N.M. 15, 168 P.2d 96 (1946).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-8-9 (Repl. 1961).
Ibid.
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quire title by adverse possession and this right is capable of protection
40
by means of redemption from tax sale.1
Now under our tax laws, a person has a right to acquire title to
land by adverse possession. He must found his right, among other
factors, upon color of title and possession and the payment of taxes. It
would seem that since payment of taxes is a factor, it is no far cry to
say that he has such an interest as will permit him to redeem from a
tax sale, since paying the redemption money is in itself a species of
payment of taxes. . . . And furthermore, the failure of one in possession of land under color of title to redeem would entitle the tax
title holder to take possession of the land . . . which would interrupt and deprive the erstwhile possessor of an essential element in his
quest to acquire title by adverse possession. The analogy is apparent.
The holder of a tax sale certificate has an inchoate right only, so has
the adverse claimant in possession of land a right inchoate, which if
1 41
pursued and protected, may ripen into title.

In McGrail v. Fields,14 ' the plaintiff, McGrail, brought an action
to quiet title. The defendant, Helen Fields, denied that the plaintiff
had title to the property, and specially pleaded the ten-year statute
of limitation. She claimed title through mesne conveyances from
W. F. Roark. In 1929, C. L. Moore, a married man-his wife not
joining in t' . conveyance-conveyed the property by warranty deed
to Roark. 'L was the community property of Moore and his wife.
Roark went into possession; on March 30, 1935, he and his wife
conveyed to P. L. Hubby; and on October 23, 1945, Hubby and
wife conveyed to the defendant. Mrs. Moore died, survived by her
husband. He died, survived by W. L. Moore, son and sole heir-atlaw, who quitclaimed the property on November 28, 1945, to the
plaintiff.
Roark and then Hubby paid all taxes on the property when due,
except on two occasions. The property was sold for taxes for the
year 1936, but redemption was made therefrom by Roark. The
property was also sold for taxes for the year 1942, but Hubby
redeemed through an agent.
The trial court found, inter alia, that the adverse possessors had
continuously paid all taxes on the land which were levied during the
statutory period, and gave judgment for the defendant on her coun140. Turner v. Sanchez, 50 N.M. 15, 21, 168 P.2d 96, 99-100 (1946).
141. Id. at 22, 168 P.2d at 100.
142. 53 N.M. 158, 203 P.2d 1000 (1949).
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terclaim to quiet title. The supreme court reversed and remanded
with instructions to quiet title in the plaintiff :
The plaintiff asserts that defendant did not 'continuously' pay all
the taxes which during the period of claimed limitation had been
levied upon the land in suit as required by the limitation statute. This
contention is based upon the facts that the property was sold for the
taxes of 1947 and again for the taxes of 1942, but was redeemed in
each case by the defendant's predecessor in title or agent. The taxes
were otherwise 'continuously' paid.
The question is whether the redemption of property from a tax
sale is payment of taxes.
The weight of authority supports plaintiff's contention ...
[Citations omitted.]
The California courts in construing a statute [Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. § 325] in language almost identical with ours, concluded that
redemption from tax sales is 'payment of taxes' as the phrase is used
in the California limitation statute. . . . [Citations omitted.]
We come now to consider the New Mexico cases. [In several
earlier opinions, the court had said that redemption from tax sale
amounted to or was nothing more than "payment of taxes," but none
of these decisions specifically, or even indirectly, involved a construction of the limitation statute.]
Our holding in the New Mexico cases mentioned, is not a rule of
property, because the specific question here discussed was not involved. We are constrained to follow the general rule. We therefore
hold that a redemption of property from a tax sale is not 'payment of
taxes' in the sense that phrase is used in our limitation statute here
4
construed.1 3

G. Disabilities.
The two New Mexico statutes of limitation for the institution of
44
an action by the legal owner contain identical disabilities clauses.1
143. Id. at 165-68, 203 P.2d at 1004-06.
144. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-1-21, -22 (1953). These disability provisions read:
Provided, that if any person entitled to commence or prosecute such suit or
action is or shall be, at the time the cause of action therefor first accrued, imprisoned, of unsound mind, or under the age of twenty-one . . . years, then
the time for commencing such action shall in favor of such persons be extended
so that they shall have one . . . year after the termination of such disability
to commence such action; but no cumulative disability shall prevent the bar
of the above limitation, and this proviso shall only apply to those disabilities
which existed when the cause of action first accrued and to no other.
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Neher v. Armijo 1 '5appears to be the first decision in New Mexico
in which the disability of a true owner of the land at the time of the
inception of the adverse possession was raised to defeat the acquisition of title by adverse possession. The disability consisted of the
infancy of two of the owners of interests in the property at that
time. It was held that such infants had, respectively, three years
from the time of reaching their majority within which to bring an
action to recover possession of the property. The three year period
later was reduced by statutory amendment to one year. 4 6
In Field v. Turner,1 47 the plaintiff brought an action to recover
an undivided one-half interest in a half-section of land. Elvis Bullock
and his wife, while the former was insane, conveyed the one-half
interest to H. Field for its full value, on June 3, 1936, without the
exercise of coercion or undue influence. Elvis continued insane until
his death, which occurred on April 27, 1942. Field filed his deed for
record and went into possession, and he and his heirs thereafter
continued in adverse possession, timely paying all taxes. On May
2, 1950, the Field heirs filed suit to quiet title as against the Bullock
heirs, and also as against one Turner who held an oil and gas lease
on the property executed by the Bullock heirs. The Bullock heirs
and a guardian ad litem for Deward Bullock, who had been insane
at least since before the death of his father, Elvis, disaffirmed the
deed from their father and mother to H. Field, tendered back the
consideration, less rents and profits, and asked that they be allowed
to recover the interest in the land which would have gone to them
on the death of their father.
The trial court held that the claims of the defendant heirs were
barred ten years after the delivery of the deed and the grantee's
entry into possession of the property. The supreme court affirmed:
The parties agree that the deed of an insane person is voidable
and not void, but they disagree as to the applicable statute and when
it started running, the appellants contending the ten-year statute
[Section 23-1-22148] . . . governs and that it, except as to the in-

sane appellant, started running on the death of the grantor. The
145. 9 N.M. 325, 54 Pac. 236 (1898).

146. N.M. Laws 1899, ch. 63, § 1 (amending § 23-1-21) ; N.M. Laws 1899, ch. 53, § 2
(amending § 23-1-22).
147. 56 N.M. 31, 239 P.2d 723 (1952).
148. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-22 (1953). The disability provisions of this statute are
quoted in note 144 supra.
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guardian ad litem says as his ward was insane at the time of the death
of his father, limitations never started running against him. The
appellees contend the four-year statute [Section 23-1-4149] . . . controls, but if it be determined that the ten-year statute applies the
claim was barred at the time of the filing of the cross-complaint for
the reason limitation began to run at the time of the filing of the deed
to Field for record and his entry into possession of the property,
and that the insanity of Deward Bullock cannot be tacked to that of
his father so as to suspend the operation of the ten-year statute.' 50

The supreme court, after an extended analysis of cases from Iowa
and other jurisdictions, reached the following conclusions: First:
The statute of limitations started running at the time of the delivery
of the deed of June 3, 1936, and the entry into possession thereunder of the grantee, H. Field, regardless of the fact that Elvis
Bullock was then insane. Second: If Elvis Bullock had recovered his
sanity at any time during the period of ten years, then he would
have had the right to bring an action within the ten-year period or
within one year after recovering his sanity, whichever period would
have given him the longer time. Third: If Elvis Bullock had continued alive and insane for a period longer than the ten-year period,
and then had recovered his sanity, he would have had a period of
one year in which to bring an action. Fourth: If Elvis Bullock had
continued alive and insane for a period longer than the ten-year period, and then had died insane, his heirs would have had a period of
one year after his death in which to bring an action. Fifth: Where,
as here, Elvis Bullock died while insane within the ten-year period,
and more than one year of that period remained to run, his heirs
must bring their action within the ten-year period from the time of
the entry of Field into possession. Here, when Elvis died, four years
still remained of the ten-year period; consequently, there is no occasion to extend the running of the statute for the one-year period.
Sixth: As the statute specifically says, the disability of Elvis must
have been one which existed, as it did, at the time the adverse possession began. Seventh: As the statute also specifically provides,
successive disabilities may not be tacked; therefore, the insanity of
the heir, Deward, could not be tacked to that of his father, Elvis.
149. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-4 (1953).
150. Field v. Turner, 56 N.M. 31, 32, 239 P.2d 723, 724 (1952).
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CONCLUSION
Since this article is expository rather than expostulatory, the
usual form of conclusion is inappropriate. It is to be hoped, however, that if some future controversy permits, the Supreme Court of
New Mexico will make perfectly clear its position on the problem of
subjective versus objective intent. It is believed that a certain inconsistency exists as between the boundary dispute cases and the
decisions as to claim of right or of title and good faith in the color
of title cases.
The article does not purport to be complete either as to New
Mexico citations or as to certain questions of minor import. An
example is the matter of exemption of certain governmental agencies from disseisin because of the nonapplicability of statutes of
limitations to their remedies.
It was at first suggested that most of the quotations from the
courts' opinions should be relegated to the footnotes, in the customary fashion. But footnotes are seldom given as much attention
as is afforded the text. It was desired that these quotations have a
better chance to be read,15 ' and so they have been placed in the text.

151. The writer had used the same method in a production on adverse possession
for his property students, which served as the inspiration for this article.

